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'When administrative activity is questioned in court, statutory inter-
pretation almost certainly ensues. When this interpretation takes the
form of reading a statute to determine the scope of the jurisdiction of
the court, such a reading will be done in a context of strain because
of questions about the relationship between the courts and the legislature.
These questions are of high moment because they bear upon two
branches of government, each of which carries a constitutional endowment
of independence within its own sphere. This independence is reflected
in the Ohio supreme court's unwillingness to abandon its natural con-
cern for justiciability as an essential element of the court's business despite
the existence of seemingly liberal court-opening statutes providing for
administrative review.
Prior to 1968, the Ohio constitution granted to the supreme court
"such revisory jurisdiction of the proceedings of administrative officers
as may be conferred by law."' Although the constitution then made
no specific provision for administrative review by the lower state courts,
it did grant to the common pleas courts jurisdiction as "fixed by law."'
Pursuant to this authorization the General Assembly enacted two statutes,
one providing review by the court of common pleas of "every final order,
adjudication or decision of any officer, tribunal .. .or other division
of any political subdivision of the state,"3 and the other, part of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, providing review in the Court of Common
Pleas of Franklin County for "any person adversely affected by an order
of an agency in adopting, amending or rescinding a rule." As enabling
* Professor of Law and Public Administration, The Ohio State University.
'Ono CONST., art. IV, § 2 (1851).
2 Oso CONsT., art. IV, § 4 (1851).
3 OHO REv. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (Page supp. 1972), which provides:
Every final order, adjudication, or decision of any officer, department or other
division of any political subdivision of the srate may be reviewed by the common
pleas court of the county in which the principal office of the political subdivision is
located....
The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised
Code is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law.
Not covered as a final order, adjudication, or decision are orders from which there is an appeal
and hearing before a higher administrative authority, orders which do not constitute a determi-
nation of the rights, duties, privileges, benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person, and
orders issued preliminary to or as a result of a criminal proceeding. Id.
4 OsHo REV. CODE ANN. § 119.11 (Page 1953), which provides:
Any person adversely affected by an order of an agency in adopting, amend-
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legislation these statutes seem to grant very broad jurisdictional power
to the lower courts; however such is not the case. In Zangerle v, Evatt
the Ohio supreme court held that the term "proceedings," as used in
its own constitutional grant to revise administrative decisions, was techni-
cal in meaning and encompassed only those proceedings which were
quasi-judicial.5 Thus, as subsequently defined, the revisory jurisdiction of
the courts under the review statutes can extend only to those proceedings
that include notice to the aggrieved person, a hearing, and an opportunity
to introduce evidence.6 For all other proceedings the courts are limited
to deciding whether the particular administrative rule is "reasonable and
lawful as applied to the facts of a particular justiciable case.' 7
On May 7, 1968, the Ohio voters adopted the Modern Courts
Amendment to the constitution and thereby furnished a new tool for
determining the sphere of judicial review." The amendment made only
a minor change to supreme court jurisdiction, adding "or agencies" to
the existing grant of review over administrative officers, but it made a
more substantial change in respect to common pleas, with this entirely
new language: "The courts of common pleas shall have such original
jurisdiction over all justiciable matters and such powers of review of pro.
ceedings of administrative officers as may be provided by law."O Syntacti-
cally, the amendment could be interpreted to eliminate justiciability as
a prerequisite to administrative review in common pleas courts. That
is, the word justiciable appears to limit only the matters over which the
court has "original jurisdiction," while there is no such limitation upon
the proceedings over which the court has "review" power. The supreme
ing, or rescinding a rule . . . may appeal to the court of common pleas of Franklin
county on the ground that said agency failed to comply with the law in adopting,
amending, rescinding, publishing, or distributing said rule, or that the rule as
adopted or amended by the agency is unreasonable or unlawful, or that the rescis-
sion of the rule was unreasonable or unlawful.
Appeals from orders issued pursuant to certain types of adjadication are governed by 011O
REv. CODE ANN. § 119.12 (Page 1969). The agencies covered by both sections are defined
in § 119.01(A).
5 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942). Zangerle involved the revisory jurisdiction
of the supreme court under the constitution, art. IV, § 2, as applied to a rule by the tax
commissioner for classifying taxable property. The rule was previously found reasonable after
a hearing by the board of tax appeals, and the auditors of two counties pursued an appeal.
But the court sua sponte dismissed them on the ground that the administrative proceedings
were not quasi-judicial and were consequently outside both the constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction of the court.
6 M. J. Kelly Co. v. Cleveland, 32 Ohio St. 2d 150, 290 N.E.2d 563 (1972).
7 Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942) (syllabus of the court, em-
phasis added). The auditors offered evidence of the effects of the rule upon the oil company
taxpayers, but the taxpayers were not parties nor had they appeared before the board of tax
appeals.
8 OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(c).
9 ORio CoNsT. art. IV, § 4(B) (emphasis added).
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court, however, has continued to insist upon justiciability for review cases,
as well as others. The 1968 amendment was promptly found to restrict
application of the administrative review statutes, and attempts by plain-
tiffs to invoke the court's jurisdiction failed for lack of a case.10 Misun-
derstanding the meaning of "proceedings" has sprung a trap upon the
unwary plaintiff who would have had no doubt that the General Assem-
bly had used in each statute words apt for his purpose in seeking judicial
review.
The discussion here will not undertake an examination of the original
question whether the constitutional term "proceedings" should have been
given restrictive meaning in relation to common pleas jurisdiction. The
accumulation of cases appears to entrench this meaning to the point that
the profession is justified in relying upon it. In addition, concern over
an appropriate meaning is unlikely to become a matter of such political
interest as to prompt further constitutional amendment. Rather, this
article is devoted to two objects. The first is an effort to explain what
effect the selected cases have on the standing of a person to contest ad-
ministrative authority in court. The second object is to develop an argu-
ment that a plaintiff who has unsuccessfully sought to invoke either of
the two review statutes may nonetheless properly be in court and entitled
to contest an administrative determination, even if there have been no
proceedings of any description. This argument must be advanced because
the Ohio supreme court has left its judgments unclear, in that its opinions
have expressed consistent holdings about jurisdiction of tie subject matter
that do not necessarily support the orders disposing of the appeals. That
is, by analogy, if a plaintiff fails to make proper service of process upon
the defendant, such that no jurisdiction of the person is acquired, an
order dismissing the action leaves no doubt as to the holding in the case.
By contrast the fact that a plaintiff in common pleas has not attended
to, or has misconceived the force of, "proceedings" in the 1968 amend-
ment is not in itself determinative of whether he has successfully invoked
the subject matter jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction: an order
dismissing the action does not follow from the interpretation given "pro-
ceedings" by the holding in the case.1 '
The ideal of equality before the law has endowed the common law
tradition with wholesome skepticism of the administrator or program spe-
cialist, especially if the administrator also wields political authority.
10 E.g., Former v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).
11 For additional analysis of recent case law concerning administrative review, see Note,
Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions in Ohio, 34 OHio ST. LJ. 853 (1973).
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Guided by this ideal, the common law, later supplemented by statutes,
developed procedures for the review of administrative determinations.
These procedures include either re-trying the underlying factual issues,
if any, or attributing some degree of finality to the administrative deter-
mination. Outside the Anglo-American system review is conducted ex-
clusively by administrative authority, or in effect the administration has
its own judicature. However in the United States review is accomplished
through the courts, a lay judicature pretending to no special expertise
in administrative matters. 2
If the judges are laymen, in contrast to the administrators or program
specialists, how does this limit the scope of the court's review? According
to accepted doctrine the court is not to determine administrative policy, but
rather the court is to determine whether an individual subjected to regula-
tion has a court case against the administrator. As an examination of
the following cases will indicate, the power of the court is measured
by the amount of discretion granted to the decisions of each administra-
tive body by the legislature.13  How then does a teacher compare with
a public works bidder, with a barkeeper, with a brewer, in the attempt
by each to obtain judicial review of an administrative determination? If
there are differences among them, equality before the law would require
that the differences be attributable not to the courts, but to the legislature
and policies enacted within its constitutional discretion.
Susan DeLong had a "limited contract" for a term of three years
with the Southwest School District in Hamilton County, Ohio. When
her contract came up for renewal her superintendent recommended exten.
sion of tenure, but the school board unanimously voted against re-employ.
ment. In doing so, the school board was acting pursuant to state statutes
which allow the board, by a three fourths vote, to reject the superinten-
dent's recommendation and which allow the board to act without giving
the teacher an opportunity to be heard. Although the determination by
the board was quasi-judicial, in that it amounted to enforcement of school
12The unique position of the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County as the only
lower state court to which administrative review is permitted under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act might be considered a partial adoption of the Continental approach, yet this court
is part of the lay judicature.
13 When the court determines whether a rule should be set aside, it is not implicated In
the formulation of a rule. The officer or agency continues to be charged with that function.
The court merely determines whether the plaintiff must either wait or pursue administrative
adjudication, or whether he may now have relief in court. Whether such relief must be judi.
cial declaration of the nullity of the rule or may extend to its modification depends upon judi-
cial doctrines of severability and scope of administrative discretion concerning remedy. In ad.
dition the statute endowing the officer or agency with discretion to make rules and the consti-
tutional scope of the legislature to authorize rule making by other officers must be considered.
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law, it was made without quasi-judicial procedure. Without conducting
a hearing the board determined the teacher's rights.
Miss DeLong contended that a vested statutory right had been
abridged and sought judicial review of the board's determination. How-
ever in DeLong v. Board of Education,'14 a short, two-branched opinion,
the Ohio supreme court affirmed the dismissal of her suit. In the first
branch the court adhered to its traditional approach and held that review
was not possible because the proceeding before the school board had not
been quasi-judicial.5 The more significant portion of the opinion is the
second or alternative branch in which the court proceeded to the merits
of the claim. The statutes were held not to create any rights in the
teacher, but rather to preserve for the school board "the final say in
all re-employment situations."'6 The General Assembly had lodged the
discretion in the school board, and the questions of fact underlying the
determination not to renew the contract were the exclusive business of
the board: it has "the final say." Miss DeLong did enjoy standing, under
the second branch of the opinion, to have the court ascertain the applica-
ble statute and apply it to her case. And this occurred without a constitu-
tional challenge to the distribution of power between the superintendent
and the school board or to the lack of a hearing for the teacher. Nor
was there a claim of corruption, bias, conflict-of-interest, or denial of con-
stitutional rights on the part of the board.
The willingness of the court in DeLong to recognize standing is a
significant departure from its earlier decision in M. J. Kelley Co. v. Cleve-
land,17 also an action for review under the local administration statute.
The M. J. Kelley Co. failed to get a contract to improve and expand
utilities in the City of Cleveland. Although Kelley Co. had submitted
a bid of $123,029, the city board of control instead awarded the work
to Henry B. Sherman, Inc., which bid $154,690. This apparent assault
upon the taxpayer was unexplained-not even political favoritism was
alleged. However the terms of the bidding were set by city council,
which specified that it was to be "competitive" and that award should
go to the "lowest responsible bidder." Although the inference about
DeLong is that she was not as good a teacher as the board thought it
could find to replace her, there is no room for inference about how cheap-
ly the Kelley firm would work, rather the inference is that the board
of control considered the Sherman firm to be on the order of $30,000
-1-36 Ohio St 2d 62,303 N.E2d 890 (1973).
-5Id. at 64, 303 N.E.2d at 892.
I6 Id.
1732 Ohio St 2d 150, 290 N.E.2d 562 (1972).
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worth "more responsible." If administrative bodies are endowed with
unreviewable discretionary powers, then both inferences, including ques-
tions of- their reasonableness and factual bases, should belong to the local
administration, not to the judge of the court of common pleas.
Nothing in the Kelley opinion indicates that the supreme court read
the city ordinance as a grant by the legislative arm (city council) of
final decision-making authority to the board of control. Rather the opin-
ion by the chief justice hews to earlier precedent,"' which also served
as the basis for the first branch of the decision in DeLong. That is,
since the board of control was not required to give advance notice of
its meeting or to have bidders present at its meeting or to take testimony
or to hold a hearing, its action was not quasi-judicial, and the court had
no review jurisdiction."9 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the appeal, although it rejected the characterization of the
trial court, which viewed the determination as "legislative."" That is,
the supreme court based its decision on the nature of the proceeding,
quasi-legislative, whereas the trial court based its decision on the nature
of the activity performed, legislation or rule-making.
But it is reasonably certain in Kelley that the city council had com-
pletely performed the legislative process when it set forth the "lowest
responsible bidder" requirement and that the trial court in characterizing
the board's award as legislative was conceptually incorrect. There is
nothing to show that the board was determining policy. Rather, it was
carrying it out, an aspect of administration normally subject to judicial
scrutiny at the behest of a party having standing.2' It is hardly open
to argument, at least until this case, that if a plaintiff or relator is pre-
pared to show legal injury by an official (or can show even "private
attorney general" status created by statute22 ), standing obtains. The ideal
18 Former v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.E.2d 371 (1970).
19 32 Ohio St. 2d at 154, 290 N.E.2d at 565.
20 Id. at 152, 290 N.E.2d at 563. The trial court relied upon prior supreme court prec-
edent, Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d 155, 216 N.E.2d 877 (1966), wherein it was stated,
"[the local administration statute] relates to appeals from administrative orders of such bodies;
it does not provide for appeals from legislative bodies or from resolutions of administrative
bodies promulgated in a delegated legislative capacity." Id, at 156, 216 N.E.2d at 878. The
supreme court in Kelley concedes that the quoted language from Tuber "indicates that an ad.
ministrative act is appealable;" however it qualifies that appealability by requiring that the act
be a result of a quasi-judicial proceeding. 32 Ohio St. 2d at 152-53, 290 N.13-2d at 564,
21 In Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E.2d 639 (1942), the auditors did not
qualify as parties adverse to the rule by seeking to demonstrate impact upon the oil companies,
although this impact would in turn produce a loss in revenues for the counties in which the
oil companies were located. The court's emphasis upon the oil companies' not having been
parties implies that the auditors were no, "private attorneys general" in the sense that they
would have standing to demonstrate that their respective counties were aggrieved,
22 For recent developments in the federal law of standing, see Association of Data Proc.
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of equality before the law is radically inconsistent with judicial timidity
inspired by no more than the imposing cloak of official authority the
defendant seeks to draw around himself. The state officer or agency
is only another defendant, just as the county prosecutor is only another
plaintiff.
Although neither the trial court nor the supreme court opinion ana-
lyzes the facts as suggested above, they may be understood, with the help
of the teacher case, as presenting a situation of a plaintiff without stand-
ing, rather than a situation of no jurisdiction. The discretion of the
board of control like that of the school board is final, not because the
judges are overawed by official status, but because the duly constituted
legislative authority has said so.2
The two remaining cases to be examined involved efforts to contest
administrative activity in court pursuant to the Administrative Procedure
Act.2 In one, Fortner v. Thomas,=  the plaintiff failed; in the other,
Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Commission,20 the plaintiff succeeded. Both
cases involve the same industry, intoxicating beverages, but it might appear
that brewers are more protected from official discretion than barkeepers,
just as brewers appear to be more protected than public works bidders.
First, the barkeeper, who must have a permit from the liquor department.
He came to court to complain about a new regulation that he said af-
fected him by reducing the freedom to manage his business that the li-
quor permit had previously allowed. The supreme court held that there
is nothing justiciable about such a complaint and that the statute provid-
ing judicial review of state agencies and officers is ineffectual to give
the complaint vigor: here there was no hearing, and jurisdiction could
not be exercised. 7
The review statute in very broad terms invites the permit holder to
the Common Pleas Court of Franklin County specifically in rule-making
cases, yet justiciability was absent. It would be puzzling if the legal
system keeps the barkeeper and the bidder out of court, but lets the cor-
Setv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970), in which the Court sets forth its requirement
that the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant [must] arguably [be] within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in ques-
tion." The interest to be protected need not be economic, id. at 154; however even if the
plaintiff is functioning as a private attorney general, an injury to him is required, Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
23 The court in DeLong is explicit upon this point, but its opinion in Kelley does not speak
to the finality of the board's jurisdiction as such in determining the lowest responsible bidder.
24 Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 119.01-119.13 (Page 1968). For text of the judicial re-
view provision, § 119.11, see note 4 supra.
25 22 Ohio St. 2d 13,257 N.X.2d 371 (1970).
2 034 Ohio St. 2d 93, 296 N.E.2d 261 (1973).
2- 22 Ohio St. 2d at 19-20,257 N.E.2d at 375.
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porate brewing enterprise in without a better reason than that the former
are unimportant individuals. Indeed the court does not say that one class
constitutes a greater menace to the public interest or is more deserving
of the court's protection. Rather the court's reason for keeping the bar-
keeper out lies in the meaning of the constitutional term "proceedings."
However an alternative holding on standing could have been undertaken,
one which would parallel the second branch of the DeLong opinion and
which would be more consistent with the probable facts: barkeepers can
have standing, but they must consult their counsellors instead of Franklin
County common pleas about abstract 'questions concerning what their per-
mit entitles them to do.
It does seem that the barkeeper may have made out no more than
an appeal for an advisory opinion-it could be that he was seeking to
have the court read the regulation, see whether on its face it diminished
his scope under his permit, and if it did, then see whether such diminu-
tion would be unreasonable or unlawful." As in DeLong, there seems
to have been no issue of constitutionality in the distribution of the rule-
making power between the liquor department and the legislature and
no issue of infringement of a specific constitutional right of the permit-
holder, for example, to work for the Democratic Party. Yet here, unlike
the teacher and more like the bidder, the barkeeper did not get the court
to read the regulation-at least the opinion of' the court does not so
much as hint at the contents of the regulation.
28The first paragraph of the syllabus in Fortner states that art. IV, § 4(B), of the Ohio
constitution "contemplates quasi-judicial proceedings only." 22 Ohio St. 2d 13, 257 N.l,2d
371-72 (1970); see id. at 22, 257 N.E.2d at 376 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Duncan,
expressing the belief that § 119.11 is unconstitutional "insofar as judicial review of quasi-leg-
islative rules is involved"). The second, expressly approving Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St.
563, 41 N.E.2d 369 (1942), states, "Courts will not aid in making or revising rules of ad-
ministrative officers, boards or commissions, being confined to deciding whether such rules are
reasonable and lawful as applied to the facts of a particular justiciable case." Id., 257 Nl.2d
at 372 (emphasis added). The facts of a particular justiciab!e case may, however, arise and be
shown in court without a prior quasi-judicial proceeding, contrary to the conclusion of. the
first syllabus paragraph.
Both the majority and concurring opinions in Fortner imply that the procedure followed In
making the rule did not involve the taking of testimony or the restriction of decison-making
to a trial record, although what procedure was followed does not appear. Instead the opinions
seem to be predicated upon the facts that the decision was embodied in a rule and that the
plaintiff had no standing under § 119.12 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides
that a party adversely affected may appeal to the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County
any "adjudication denying the issuance or renewal of a license . or revoking or suspending
a license...."
The majority opinion characterized the proposed use of the Administrative Procedure Act
as "challenging the lawfulness of an administrative regulation in a vacuum." Id, at 17, 257
N.E.2d at 373. If carried out, such use would produce the sterile exercise of laying the rcgu-
lation beside the authorizing statute for comparison in the absence of facts showing that the
plaintiff was aggrieved by the regulation. However, the holding seems to preclude showing
such facts, either as presented in the proceedings leading to the adoption of the rule or arising
upon its promulgation and shown by evidence in court.
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As indicated above, the Burger Brewing Co. got hold of the brass
ring. The declaratory judgment statute"9 was held to afford the plaintiff
review of a liquor control commission regulation -on its face, although
the administrative review statute was held inapplicable.3 Burger was
challenging a regulation that diminished the discretion of the brewer in
pricing its product, and there was not doubt that such a diminution would
occur. There was need for legal advice, preferably from the highest and
most binding source, although it remains shrouded in doubt whether the
barkeeper was not as necessitous of advice in proportion to his financial
scale. Neither the brewer nor the barkeeper had been directly subjected
to the application of the rule; however Burger was able to adduce evi-
dence of the cost of compliance, although it is not clear whether a person
holding a permit like Fortner's could sufficiently quantify his detriment
in anticipation of enforcement of the rule. Note that in Former the
court considered that the questiofi was presented in a "vacuum," whereas
in Burger it did not. Despite these differences and with respect, it is
submitted that the Burger opinion would be clearer had it not attempted
to distinguish Fortner and had forthrightly overruled it."
There are two dimensions of justiciability which must be considered
here. The first is ripeness, which requires that the controversy be real
and immediate so that the facts and issues are in a context suitable for
judicial resolution. In none of the four cases is there indication that
the administrative rule being challenged was based upon a trial hearing
at which the party now claiming to be aggrevied had a right to appear
and enter evidence. Although the opinion in Burger makes elliptical
reference to hearings before the liquor commission, 2 there is no indica-
tion that the commission relied upon them in formulating its rule, nor
was any issue raised concerning the relationship of the hearings to the
rule. -Thus the state and local agencies appear to have proceeded after
the manner of the legislature, which need not hold hearings and which,
if it does, is not restricted to the record thereby developed in making
its decision. Even with no semblance of a hearing ripeness was clearly
satisfied in the teacher and bidder cases, involving review under the local
29 OHO REV. CODE ANN. § 2721.03 (Page supp. 1973), which provides:
Any person . . . whoze rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a
. . . rule as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised Code (or] municipal ordi-
nance... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising un-
der such . .. rule [or] ordinance.. . and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or
other legal relations thereunder.
-
3 Burger Brewing Co. v. Liquor Comm'n, 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 96, 100, 296 N.E.2d 261,
263, 266 (1973).
3 1 If the result in Fortner was correct, the reasoning seems unadequate to explain it.
S2 34 Ohio St. 2d at 97-98, 296 N.E.2d at 264-65.
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administration statute. In them no further exercise of administrative dis-
cretion, prosecutorial or otherwise, would make the facts more certain
or the evaluation of the aggrieved party's asserted interest more careful,
or would render the controversy moot. The teacher had lost her job;
the bidder, the award. On the other hand, in both liquor commission
cases there were no "proceedings" within the meaning of the constitu-
tional provision about common pleas jurisdiction, and, in both, further
exercise of administrative discretion in application of the rule was pos-
sible. Thus the claim of the regulated party could be rendered moot
either by failure to apply the rule to him or by a resolution favorable
to him in a licensing hearing, and in any event the factual issues to
be presented to the court could be further refined in the licensing hearing.
The brewer, nevertheless, obtained remand for further proceedings. Un-
der the declaratory judgment statute, the issues were held ready for ju-
dicial resolution because "hearings were held and briefs were submitted
before the commission drafted the regulation in its present form." 8 As
stated above, the court does not address the question whether the decision
embodied in the regulation was at large, like that of the legislature, or
whether it was based upon the hearings, nor does it label the procedure
as "quasi-judicial," which constitutional doctrine seems to require. But
the "vacuum" has disappeared because "the regulation itself essentially
involves legal questions.13 4
Also, the parties were adverse:
Since the plaintiffs are convinced that the regulation is invalid, they
are placed in a perplexing dilemma: Either change their customary pric-
ing and marketing procedures in order to conform with the regulation or
challenge the regulation by disobedience and face severe sanctions ...
It was to lift people from the horns of such a dilemma that the Declara-
tory Judgement Act was enacted.3 5
Thus the plaintiffs were "presently subjected to the application" of the
rule. 0
33 ld. at 99,296 N..2d at 266.
34 Id. at 98, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
35 Id. at 99, 296 N.E.2d at 265.
36M. at 100, 296 N.E.2d at 266. The felicitous expres-ion of Mr. Justice Harlan, "pte-
enforcement suit," and the context in which it arose merit ,:onsideration at this point. The
term was used in a case in which the administrative resoluuon was final and the attack pre-
sented the purely legal issue of ultra vires. Justice Harlan determined that the regulation
merely served notice that the commissioner might take steps under it and that the regulated
parties need do no:hing as insurance against violating it should the regulation turn out to have
been intra vires. Judicial review was rejected. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S, 158,
164-66 (1967). Justice Harlan also wrote for the Court in two companion cases which held
the rules reviewable, Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), and Gardner v.
Toilet Goods Ass'n, 387 U.S. 167 (1967). The latter case was distinguished by Justice lor-
[Vol. 35
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The existence of some kind of pre-determination hearing, apparently
without regard to its impact on the rule that is made, plus the presence
of a dilemma, albeit one involving legal questions only, may become
the foundation for arguing that rule-making is "quasi-judicial" and that
the requisite ripeness for justiciability is established to qualify within the
jurisdiction of the court of common pleas. If so, the constitutional mean-
ing of "proceedings" is wider than heretofore indicated.
The other element of justiciability to be considered is standing, which
requires that an interest of the plaintiff be detrimentally affected by the
challenged rule. If the value of the interest is so low that administrative
discretion constitutes its metes and bounds, like the discretion of a donor,
standing may be lacking. In the absence of detriment to a substantial
interest, there is no genuine plaintiff to make the adversary system work;
the issue is feigned or abstract, perhaps congenial to the classroom, but
wasteful if used to attract judicial resources.
Only in the teacher case has the court directly confronted the question
of standing, by its holding that the discretion of the board was final-
apparently the court in DeLong considered the value of continued em-
ployment substantial enough to reach the merits of the claim. By con-
trast the court emphasized in both the barkeeper and the bidder cases
that there had been no adjudicative procedure before the administrative
body. Thus the supreme court avoided questions of scope of review and
of finality of administrative discretion by concentrating upon the supposed
jurisdiction of the court.
The two efforts of the General Assembly to assure judicial surveillance
of administrative activity pale by contrast with its provision for the rem-
edy known as the declaratory judgment. The apparent conclusion to
be drawn is that the remedies of the court of common pleas determine
its jurisdiction. However, it will be argued in the following lines that
the second branch of the opinion in DeLong, finality of administrative
decision, should also lead to the conclusion that the constitutional mean-
ing of "proceedings" is not as narrow as heretofore indicated, and that
while the remedy sought by a plaintiff may indeed raise questions of
ripeness and standing, the label affixed to the remedy sought should not
be regarded as controlling the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdic-
tion.
lan's opinion in the other Toilet Goods case as showing immediate impact of administrative
action and as involving horrendous failure-to-comply sanctions: seizure of goods, adverse pub-
litciy, and possible criminal liability. Toilet Goods Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 164-65
(1967). In Ohio the three cases other than Burger suggest that there is no such concept as
pre-enforcement suit, unless provision has been made for adjudication by quasi.judicial proce-
dure.
1974]
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Professional habits die hard. Over a century ago Ohio took a radical
step away from common law pleading and assured plaintiffs that they
could get into court without having to select among forms of action.87
But, as F. W. Maitland has aptly stated, "The forms of action we have
buried, but they still rule us from their graves."38 Susan DeLong, the
teacher, suffered no harm from the professional atherosclerosis that has
produced a sequence of no-jurisdiction decisions. She obtained a judg-
ment that her claim involved no legally protected interest. But the no-
jurisdiction holdings in the barkeeper and bidder cases appear to ignore
the principles that form shall not be exalted over substance and that
the hapless plaintiff is not to suffer simply because his advocate chooses
the wrong label. Equality before the law is ill-served by this type of
technicality.
Suit under either of the administrative review statutes poses a threat
that the supreme court will hold that the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Yet the language of the statutes speaks to equality of all aggrieved par-
ties. The Administrative Procedure Act was held to deny jurisdiction in
Fortner, and the local administration statute, in Kelley. On the other
hand, the local statute did not prevent the court in DeLong from reaching
the standing question (and effectively the merits), and in Burger the
order of the court is not couched in terms of lack of jurisdiction. Burger
states:
Therefore, the judgment of the Court of Appeals, determining that a
declaratory judgment action was not an available remedy, is reversed;
and, as to such issue, the cause is remanded to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.39
Ripeness and standing may obtain even in judicial review of a rule, as
shown by Burger. The significance of this conclusion is that the constitu-
tional scope of "proceedings" subject to review in the court of common
pleas is greater than previously indicated in Fortner and Kelley. And
37 "The distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such
actions and suits, heretofore existing, are abolished; and in their place, there shall be, here-
after, but one form of action, which shall be called a civil action." 01IO GEN. CODIE §
11238 (1938). The first application of this statute to review of administrative action before
the supreme court may have been Chinn v. Trustees, 32 Ohio St. 236 (1877), a mandamus to
obtain a veteran's bounty from the township. The court held the suit to be neither an action
at law nor a suit in equity, and not a civil action under the code. The mandamus jurisdiction
of the supreme court, however, seems to be jurisdiction of a veritable civil action. State ex rel.
Cope v. Cooper, 121 Ohio St. 519, 169 N.E. 701 (1930). Subsequently mandamus in com-
mon pleas was likewise held a civil action. State ex rel. Wilson v. Preston, 173 Ohio St. 203,
181 N.E.2d 31 (1962) (a proceeding to compel the director of highways to give a lessee relief
in connection with use of his land to develop the Millcreek Expressway in Cincinnati).
38 F. MAITLAND, THE FORMs OF ACTION AT COMMON I.Aw 2 (1936).
a9 34 Ohio St. 2d 93, 100, 296 N.E.2d 261, 266 (1973).
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if this is so, then in those cases the court had jurisdiction to reach the
questions of ripeness and standing, respectively. Finally in DeLong the
court did confront justiciability. It is submitted that the result in Burger
and the second branch of the decision in DeLong indicate that the court
is abandoning its fixation on "quasi-judicial proceedings" and is moving
toward a more appropriate emphasis upon ripeness and standing.
Two conclusions may be offered, based upon the court's somewhat
muddled treatment of the 1968 constitutional amendment with respect
to the jurisdi&ion of the court of common pleas. First, suppose the Gen-
eral Assembly values an interest highly enough to require the administra-
tive body to make its determination on the basis of a trial hearing. In
that case, if the regulated party seeks judicial review to contest a determi-
nation on the ground that no hearing was provided, he is assailing the
lack of a procedurally supportable factual basis for the decision. Such
a plaintiff would have standing. Second, suppose the determination takes
the form of an order promulgatin'g, amending, or rescinding a rule, and
that the determination was based upon a trial hearing. A person inter-
ested in the rule and actually a party to the administrative hearing is
not assured of instant review. He may be required to wait until the
rule is applied individually to him, unless somehow he can demonstrate
that its mere promulgation, under all the circumstances, so injures him
that he should be able instantly to contest its validity on its face.
If these propositions are sound, the more recent formulation of the
court in Burger relates not to the jurisdiction of the subject matter in
any exact sense, but rather to jurisdiction to proceed to a remedy, i.e., de-
claratory judgment as contrasted with something called "review." Never-
theless, until the court gets it all together a little better, counsel advising
would-be plaintiffs will do well to consider whether it can be shown that
the client had a right to an administrative determination based upon a
trial hearing. If it can be demonstrated that such a requirement was
violated, even the Administrative Procedure Act, contrary to the Fortner
precedent, ought not preclude invalidation of a rule so made. If a trial
hearing is not required, it is desirable for plaintiff to concentrate upon
pleading and proving ripeness and standing, and insofar as possible to
avoid invoking the two administrative review statutes.
This confusing state of affairs, in which rights are imperiled by incau-
tious reference to remedial statutes, would be rendered more certain if
the court would formally abjure the approach of Fortner and Kelley, in
which jurisdiction is made dependent upon whether or not the proceeding
was quasi-judicial, and would formally recognize that jurisdiction over
all proceedings has been conferred and that its only concerns are ripeness
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and standing. The scope of administrative review does not determine
jurisdiction of the subject matter. Rather review has to do with "jurisdic.
tion" (if at all) in respect of jurisdiction of the judicial remedy. Thus,
nothing in the constitutional term "proceedings" should preclude review
of administrative determinations that are unreasonable or otherwise not
in accordance with law. Neither should anything in the constitution pre.
clude the General Assembly from endowing courts with remedies by way
of overlapping statutes nor should anything in the constitution serve as
a basis for an argument that declaratory judgement is exclusive of "re-
view." The armament of a court of general jurisdiction is plenary. It
is not required to search a catalog for a jurisdictional caption.
According to Ohio Rule of Civil Procedure 2, which specifies that
there is "only one form of action, . . . a civil action,"40 an aggrieved
party is entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of the court if he can state
a claim for relief. In a court of general jurisdiction it should make
no difference whether the claim is couched in terms of "review," under
either of the local administration or state agency statutes, or in terms
of injunctive, mandamus,4' declaratory or other remedy. However
neither the declaratory judgment act nor the administrative review stat-
utes purport to apply to nonjusticiable matters. Thus, if the statement
of the claim indicates an absence of standing, which might occur when
the legislature has constitutionally made the administrative determination
"final" or when the interest to be protected is that of a non-party, the
remedy specified in the complaint, whatever its name or form, cannot
be granted. Likewise, if it should appear that the claim is not ripe for
judicial determination, which might occur when further administrative
relief must be exhausted or when further prosecutorial action is required
before the interest is infringed, there can be no judicial relief. In either
case, though, the aggrieved party is still entitled to a judgment of the
court stating that his claim is nonjusticiable. 42
The local administration review statute does not extend to rule-mak-
ing.4a It is confined to orders which affect "the rights, duties, privileges,
benefits, or legal relationships of a specified person," and even as to them
excludes "any order issued preliminary to or as the result of a criminal
proceeding. ' '44 Because rights are not subject to discretionary treatment,
40This rule carries forward OHIO GEN. CODE § 11238 (1938). For the text, see note 37
suPra.
41 State ex tel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 127 NE,2d 371
(1955) (ordinance lacking in standards, variance permits should issue).
42This was the result in Zangerle v. Evatt, 139 Ohio St. 563, 41 N.E,2d 369 (1942).
43 Tuber v. Perkins, 6 Ohio St. 2d 155, 216 N.E.2d 877 (1966).
4 4 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2506.01 (Page supp. 1972).
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there could be little question that issues involving their adjudication
would be justiciable; a party endowed with rights is "aggrieved" from
the moment any administrative action infringes them. As to privileges
and benefits, questions of standing do arise, and the court cannot grant
"review" if the matter is adjudged not to be justiciable. Nevertheless
even in this latter event the jurisdiction of the court would have been
exercised; the matter would be res judicata, binding the plaintiff not
again to invoke the jurisdiction by the same claim for relief. However
even if he did, the second judgment would properly be based upon res
judicata rather than lack of jurisdiction.
If it were contended that the local administration statute is unconstitu-
tional because it extends to cases in which the plaintiff lacks standing,
the argument would be perverse. The plaintiff in such circumstances
is merely seeking to obtain application of the statute in an unconstitution-
al manner. Similarly the argument that the statute providing for review
of rule-making can never have constitutional application seems to be a
premature prediction and essentially obiter dicta in Fortner, whatever the
precedent value of Burger.4" The premise of Fortner, that rules are not
subject to judicial review in a vacuum, is, however, a useful guide to
justiciability in cases of review of both rules and statutes. A careful
elaboration of review situations which do not present such a vacuum re-
mains for further adjudication.
Whether the plaintiff complains of state or local administrative activ-
ity, he must have a justiciable claim, but his specification of the remedy
sought bears no necessary relationship to jurisdiction. The declaratory
judgment act no more enlarges the meaning of the constitutional ambit
of "powers of review of proceedings of administrative officers"" than
does the Administrative Procedure Act, or the local administration statute.
All three enactments serve to implement parts of the constitutional grant
of jurisdiction. They are not mutually exclusive, but rather should be
construed as cumulative and, in cases where they so apply, overlapping
remedies.
4 5 
If the legislature has required that the state agency or officer grant an opportunity for a
trial hearing upon the basis of which a rule is to be formulated, use of the label "quasi.
legislative" is inappropriate. A plaintiff entitled by either the constitution or statute to such
a hearing is aggrieved when hearing is denied. He is entitled to the review specified in the
state agency statute, on the ground that the agency or officer had violated the law investing
him wi:h the right to a hearing. Similarly, a plaintiff aggrieved is one who has an immedi-
ate right to have the rule set aside because of legal error or abuse of discretion so affecting the
plaintiff as to infringe an interest then protected by law and to give the plaintiff a basis for
a claim for relief. However, mere legal uncertainty does not ordinarily attract the jurisdiction
of a court nor does the mere imposition by the legislature of the cost of litigation.
46OMo CONsT., aM IV, § 4(B).
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